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THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF LARGE
IRREGULAR AIR CARRIERS
By DR. CHARLES R.

CHERINGTON

Acting Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University

T

HE large irregular air carriers perform a number of essential functions in the present pattern of air transportation. Their significance
is likely to increase with the continuing expansion of commercial aviation in the years to come. Although their operations are sometimes
treated as competing with those offered by scheduled certificated airlines, careful analysis of their present traffic and probable future role
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that they are in fact either
supplementary to or complementary to regular scheduled operations.
The economic case for the continuance of the large irregulars, under
appropriate regulation and control, is an overwhelming one.
The economic case for the' large irregulars may be conveniently
divided into the following principal categories of analysis: (1) The
growth of American commercial, both domestic and international,
aviation since 1938 to the present and its probable further expansion in
the course of the next decade. (2) The increasing variety in the type of
traffic and service, and the relative adaptability of the scheduled certificated carriers and the large irregulars to meet the various and fluctuating needs for commercial air lift as it arises. (3) The significance of
commercial aviation to present and potential military requirements
and the role of the large irregulars in assuring that these military
requirements will be met. (4) The extent to which the continued
existence of the large irregulars, far from endangering the financial
stability of the subsidized certificated carriers, permits such certificated
carriers to conduct their operations at lower cost to the government
and at greater profit to themselves. (5) Lastly, some consideration
should be devoted to the economic principles which should be governing in administering regulatory power over freedom of entry into a
relatively new and rapidly growing branch of public transportation.
In this connection it is important to draw appropriate distinctions from,
as well as necessary parallels with other forms of transportation covered
by public regulation.
I- SPECTACULAR GROWTH IN AIR TRAFFIC
The growth of American commercial aviation since the passage of
the Civil Areonautics Act of 1938 has been spectacular. It is difficult to
say, given the circumstances. of the case, which has been the more
striking; the expansion of domestic traffic or the establishment of the
international airline network served by American flag carriers. We
have never seen anything quite like it, both as to the rapidity of the
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growth and as to the formidable character of the obstacles which have
been overcome.
This period of growth may be divided into a number of phases.
The first extended from the passage of the Act down to the time shortly
after Pearl Harbor and was marked by a mounting demand for first-class
passenger movement by air. The full extent of this demand could
hardly be accommodated by the existing equipment. But the rising
curve of passenger-seat miles gave at least some indication of what
was ahead.
The second phase came with the transfer to the government of many
of the commercial transport planes and the virtual cessation in the
delivery of new transport equipment to the certificated carriers. During
most of the war, air transportation of persons was limited by the available equipment, load factors were abnormally high and it was necessary to control traffic movement by an elaborate priorities system. Without such limitations no one knows to what heights traffic would have
increased during this period. But the airlines were sufficiently confident
of the future to order large quantities of' new equipment for post-war
delivery and the flood of new applications for certificated routes
swamped the administrative machinery of the C.A.B.
The third phase came with the beginning of the release by the military of considerable members of transport aircraft for adaptation to
and use in commercial operations. This phase continued into 1946
and was marked by the rapid growth in the traffic of the scheduled
carriers and by the beginnings of important operations by the large
irregulars. With aircraft available, it was possible to meet at least a
part of the swollen demand for commercial transport. This phase was
characterized not only by tremendous growth of revenue passenger
miles but also by the rapid rise of air freight and the development of
new markets for commercial air transport beyond anything undertaken
or even conceived of in the period before the war. The hopes of the
carriers for tremendous expansion seemed to have no limits. Not only
were large numbers of transport aircraft taken over from the military
absorbed into scheduled services and put into use by large irregulars,
but important orders were placed for new types of aircraft.
This phase of unbounded confidence and rapid expansion was
followed by a relatively short but quite sharp recession in the growth
curve. This fourth, recession phase was marked by slackening of the
growth curve, cancellation of some orders for new aircraft, growing
concern by both the C.A.B. and the regular scheduled carriers for the
stability of the industry. It was also marked by considerable distress
among the large irregular carriers which were handicapped by dealing
largely with new experimental types of traffic, and were further
hindered by conducting operations under restricted authorizations
from the C.A.B. which failed to take into account the potential utility
of large irregulars to supplement scheduled carriers and to pioneer new
types of traffic and service.
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. The fifth and final phase of growth had already set in before the
outbreak of the Korean War and has continued substantially until the
present time. The War and the related armament programs and the
rise in the flow of income payments has undoubtedly strengthened this
last phase of expansion. Yet even without war there is every reason to
believe that growth would have continued during this period.
In reviewing the long-term record of growth it is possible to draw
certain definite conclusions and to suggest certain other deductions for
tentative consideration. Firstly, the growth curve is spectacular in its
rise since 1938 and there is every reason to suppose that it will continue
for years to come. While related to growth in national income, it is in
part independent from it. This means that regardless of war and
economic recession there will be a growing volume of air traffic to be
divided between the scheduled carriers and the large irregular carriers.
Secondly, despite this long-term growth there have been, and doubtless will continue to be, temporary slackenings in the growth curve,
and even actual declines. Sometimes these will be related to nation-wide
or even world-wide economic phenomenon. At other times they may
be caused by a closely spaced series of spectacular accidents (e.g. the
unfortunate events at Newark airport in the winter of 1952). It is possible to identify past events which have had an impact on traffic with
some definiteness and to predict that these or comparable influences will
unquestionably recur. But such recurrences, regardless of what may
happen in the short run, will not arrest the long-term growth curve
for the calculable future.
Thirdly, while carrier prosperity is in the long run dependent on
high load factors and the fullest possible utilization of available aircraft, there has not been, nor is there likely to be, in the future a continuous direct correlation between the growth curve and carrier prosperity. A situation of this sort arose in the Spring of 1952. Apparently
the costs of the regular scheduled carriers mounted more rapidly than
could be compensated for by traffic increases. But the answer, from
the point of view of the authority, would seem to be a readjustment in
rates and charges along the lines of recent C.A.B. action. It is wrong
to conclude that a temporary decline in scheduled carrier earnings
warrants a more restrictive policy with regard to the operating rights
of large irregular carriers. In point of fact, as we shall see in Section IV,
exactly the opposite policy may be more helpful to the long-run
stability of the industry.
In summary, the growth of air traffic, both domestic and international, has been great, and gives promise of continuing. While there
will be setbacks as there has been in the past, and while we must face
ups and downs in carrier earnings, the prospective volume of traffic
gives sufficient ground for the C.A.B. to so administer its control over
operating authority as to permit the balanced development of regular
scheduled carriers and large irregular carriers both within the United
States and on overseas international routes throughout the world.
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II-

INCREASING

VARIETY

IN TYPES

OF TRAFFIC AND SERVICE

Even more striking than the growth in air traffic since 1938 has been
the increasing variety in the types of traffic and service. Recent growth
and probable future expansion can only be understood in terms of the
fact that air carriers have found and begun the development of new
markets, and this trend is continuing. In the process the large irregulars
have played a decisive role. Because of their inherent economic and
organizational nature they are superbly adapted to this type of developmental and pioneering work.
Prior to the war the main business of commercial carriers was
limited to the carriage of the mails, and the transportation of first-class
passengers at rates per mile as high or higher than comparable rail
movements in Pullman accommodations. The war experience provided
startling lessons in the physical possibilities of air freight and in the
mass movement of persons, in to put it mildly, less than luxury accommodations. The military air services not only lifted a volume and
variety of traffic theretofore unheard of, but also showed the way, in
part at least, to lowering costs for such new types of air lift. In the years
since the war these lessons have been used as the foundation upon
which commercial carriers have opened new markets. The regular
scheduled carriers have shared with the large irregulars this continuing
process of development, but much of the actual pioneering has been
initiated by the large irregulars. For example, although the bulk of
the so-called coach type air service is now carried by regular scheduled
lines, the existence of the coach type traffic potential and the ways in
which it could be accommodated profitably were early demonstrated
by the large irregulars. Comparable pioneering was done in the charter
market for special parties and seasonal movements of workers, students
and pilgrims. Such movements on a small scale were not unknown in
earlier periods, but the enterprise of the large irregulars has demonstrated that. these markets are larger, potentially far larger, than anything previously demonstrated by the regular scheduled carriers. The
growth of certain types of air freight has similarly been stimulated.

That this growth is economically sound is evidenced by the steady rise
in the volume of air freight carried by the regular certificated carriers,
by the expansion of newly certificated carriers which handle air freight
exclusively and by the general downward trend in the cost per ton mile
in the carriage of air freight.
In the period since the war the large irregulars have done much of
the pioneering and development work in discovering these new markets

for air transport. Their contributions might have been even greater
under different conditions of government regulation. Apparently the
C.A.B.'s original theory was to treat the large irregulars as if they were

essentially fixed base operators, and accordingly, to limit the regularity
of their flights between any two points. While this may have prevented
undersirable competition with regular scheduled lines in a few instances, it has seriously curtailed pioneering and development work in
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many other instances. This is a matter which the C.A.B. should face
up to in determining the future relations between the regular scheduled
carriers and the large irregulars.
With low overhead costs and without a fixed obligation to maintain
service regardless of economic results the large irregulars can test new
markets for transportation by air. They have a far wider range of
entrepreneurial freedom than the scheduled carriers. If the particular
operation pays out it may be further developed and, in some cases, may
eventually be turned over to the scheduled carriers for permanent
operation. On the other hand if it proves unprofitable, it is relatively
easier for a large irregular to drop the service with the least amount of
economic waste. The fact that the large irregulars do not receive subsidy
in the form of graduated mail pay makes it more likely that they will
leave uneconomic types of carriage promptly. In as rapidly growing a
field as air transportation, it is essential to preserve for pioneering and
developmental purposes that sector of the industry which today possesses a degree of entrepreneurial flexibility and under modified regulatory policies could further maximize its potential capacity to develop
new markets.
Looking ahead it is hard to predict exactly what new markets the
large irregulars might be called up to develop during the course of the
next decade. Discussion of the great possibilities of traffic movements
in connection with the direct needs of the armed forces will be reserved
for the next section. With regard to essentially civilian movements, the
following categories of traffic may be listed as having already shown
promise and/or as having great possibilities for the future.
(1) Domestic Charters for a specific flight or flights involving
a specialized irregular movement of either persons or property. The
ability of the regular scheduled carriers to lift this type of traffic on a
growing scale is limited by price and the availability of idle aircraft.
Ordinarily it will take low rates to encourage this type of movement.
And since the demand for air lift is irregular, the scheduled carriers
must either shorten maintenance layups or draw on their limited supply
of reserve planes used to protect regular schedules. In point of fact,
examination of the earnings statements of regular scheduled carriers
shows that they do relatively little of this business, for which they are
indeed not as well adapted economically as are the large irregular
carriers.
(2) Overseas irregularflights on a Charter basis. Here again the
limiting factors are price and aircraft availability.This is particularly
true in the case of tourism on the North Atlantic Run. Taking just one
segment of the potential market, there are over one million teachers in
the Schools and Colleges of the United States and something over two
million students at the collegiate level. There was a substantial trend
for people in both categories to spend long summer vacations in Europe
before the war and this trend has recently reappeared, limited, however,
by the soaring costs of ocean surface travel. Trans-oceanic air fares
are even higher and most of the fare concessions offered by regular
scheduled lines seem to be limited to off-peak seasons. To develop this
teacher-student summer traffic we will need to experiment with substantially lower rates, and the pioneering must be conducted by operators
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such as the large irregulars who have aircraft available at the appropriate time. International carriers, whether American or foreign flag,
cannot be expected to have sufficient aircraft available to meet peak
loads of such new types of traffic as may be developed. Even if aircraft
could be obtained through charter, they are less likely to experiment
with developmental rates necessary to encourage such traffic. Not only
teachers and students, but large groups of religious Pilgrims to Rome
and the Holy Land, people without the means to travel on regular first
class or coach type flights constitute a potential undeveloped market for
which the entrepreneurial flexibility of the large irregulars is best
adapted.
(3) Movements of large numbers of migratory workers, both in
domestic and international traffic has already been undertaken and
gives promise of substantial increase in the future. The volume and
character of such movements will vary from season to season, depending
on the state of domestic employment, the nature of economic activity in
given areas, crop conditions and a variety of other factors. Given the
continuance of reasonably full employment in the American economy,
there will be a growing need for conserving our native labor force by
increasing its mobility and for having periodic access to supplies of
foreign labor to meet critical situations, under appropriate regulation in
the public interest. At present migratory workers constitute a substantial element in the air lift performed by the large irregulars. The
possibilities for further development appear to be substantial.
(4) Peak load period movements between large metropolitan
centers within the United States is still another area where the large
irregulars are performing valuable. transportation services supplementary to that offered by the regular scheduled carriers. On such runs
as New York-Miami or New York-Los Angeles, there occur periods,
usually of relatively short duration, when the regular scheduled carriers
cannot lift the traffic offered even at standard rates. Such traffic peaks
cannot be met adequately by reassigning aircraft since the supply of
surplus ships in the hands of the regulars is too limited. Some traffic
eventually moves on regular carriers at great inconvenience as stand-bys
while the remainder moves by other forms of transport or on the relatively restricted operations of the large irregulars. At a subsequent point
in this general discussion we will make concrete suggestions as to how,
through changes in C.A.B. regulations the large irregulars can be
substantially more helpful, both to the regular scheduled carriers and
to the public as a whole in protecting this type of traffic.
In summary, there is a growing variety in the type of traffic and
service in both domestic and international air transportation. In this
expanding industry both the regular scheduled carriers and the large
irregulars have their roles to play. But in pioneering and developing
new types of service the potential contributions of the large irregulars
are particularly important. Contributions in the recent past are clear
for all to see. The future possibilities for pioneering, while difficult to
predict with exactness, are patently sufficient to permit the large irregulars as much freedom of action as is compatible with the over-all
financial needs of the industry.

III -

ROLE OF LARGE IRREGULAR CARRIERS IN MEETING MILITARY NEEDS

The role which the large irregulars play in meeting present and
potential military needs is of the greatest importance. The aircraft
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owned and operated by them constitute a substantial portion. of the
total national pool of air lift. These aircraft and the organizations which
manage them are maintained at no expense to the taxpayer and are
available on a standby basis for recurrent periods of national emergency.
During the recent past we havkZhad two outstanding examples of
how there may arise suddenly and'uexpectedly a real demand for such
reserve aircraft to be used in milita# -'air lift. The first example was
the Berlin air lift, the record of which is, of course, well known. The
second example is found in the combination of circumstances in and
around the Korean incident. In both cases it is clear that the availability
of transport aircraft, both in the hands of the regular scheduled airlines,
and also in the hands of large irregulars, was a factor of very considerable importance in lifting military traffic, both persons and freight,
and in providing a backlog of security in addition to and supplementary
to, facilities maintained by the armed forces themselves. It goes without saying that the availability of a substantial air lift is essential in
almost any conceivable type of military situation, and that this is true
only to a degree of lesser intensity, in the case of continuing international pressure and the future possibilities of incidents of the Korean
or Berlin lift sort.
One possible alternative of public policy would be, of course, for
the armed forces themselves to maintain a reserve supply of transport
aircraft, and to rely upon this reserve in the event of recurring emergencies. However, even if the aircraft themselves were available, it
would also be necessary to provide trained flight crews and ground
personnel, and the financial burden of such reserve facilities would
unquestionably be more than the armed forces, or the Congress would
be willing to sustain. A second alternative would be for the armed forces
to withdraw from regular scheduled commercial service a sufficient
number of transport-type aircraft to meet their needs in the event of
limited emergencies in the future. To some extent, with both the Berlin
lift and the Korean lift, this has been an expedient which has been
resorted to. The difficulty is, however, that if the emergency is sufficiently acute, or if it is of sufficiently long duration, a policy of this
sort inevitably will disrupt regular scheduled service, both domestic
and international and will run counter to the established policies of
the Congress as enunciated in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and in
subsequent administrative decisions by the C.A.B. The existence of the
transport fleets of the large irregulars, plus the availability of trained
flight crews and ground personnel is in consequence, a resource of incalculable importance in the total pattern of our air power from the
point of view of a military organization which must face the uncertainties of the next decade in the international scene.
But the economic case for the large irregulars in connection with
military traffic for the next decade does not depend upon a recurrence
of a Berlin or Korean type emergency. The total volume of military
traffic, both domestic and international, has become enormous. There
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is every reason to believe that the total volume of this traffic will continue to expand in the future. Under established policies of the armed
forces, a very considerable amount of this traffic, a growing amount in
the years to come, will move by air. Unquestionably some of this movement will be carried by the transport services of the military, while
other portions of the traffic may, of course, be lifted by regular scheduled airlines. There will continue to be, however, a growing volume of
traffic available for the types of operation for which the large irregulars
are particularly adapted. This will include irregular lifts of considerable
volume over routes which are at present difficult, if not impossible, to
predict. But the total volume of these movements in any one year will
unquestionably provide a new, and as yet unprovided for, market for
air transportation connected with regular routine military operations.
. The importance of the large irregulars in the present and prospective needs of the military constitute sufficient grounds for the continuance of this sector of the air transport industry in reasonable economic
health for a considerable time to come. However, it should be noted
that there is a relationship of a complementary sort between recurrent
periods in which the military will absorb a large proportion of the large
irregular capacity, and other periods in which the large irregulars will
be able to serve the expanding types of new traffic and service outlined
in the preceding section. In other words, under proper management and
wise regulation there is every reason to believe that the large irregulars
can play an essential role in national transport. In some instances they
will be devoting most of their energies to the pioneering type of operation previously described in civil aviation proper. On other occasions,
however, they will be available as part of the great reserve pool of
national air transport to meet the needs of the armed forces, and to
provide an additional element of national security which again we can
have without extra expense or obligation on the part of the taxpayer.
IV - LARGE IRREGULARS MAY AID FINANCIAL STABILITY
OF CERTIFICATED CARRIERS

The continued existence of the large irregulars, far from endangering the financial stability of the subsidized, certificated carriers, will on
the contrary permit such certificated carriers to conduct their operations
at lower cost to the government, and at greater profit to themselves.
In fact it can be demonstrated that this is already the case. It is necessary at this point to revert to certain economic characteristics of the
regular scheduled carriers. One authority has emphasized that the
basic economics of a regular scheduled airline is for the carrier to keep
its planes in the air and to keep them full of paying traffic. In point of
fact, of course, this ideal is not always realizable in practice. Much of
the time and on many flights, particularly on many necessary routes,
an insufficient volume of traffic offers itself for a scheduled flight. This
inevitable fact explains, in part at least, why continued subsidy in the
form of airmail pay is regarded as essential for the continued operation
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of many of the regular scheduled carriers. At the same time, the
regular scheduled lines with an eye to economic and efficient operation,
tend to hold back from providing any more aircraft than can reasonably
be utilized with profit. For many types of operation, both of the pioneering sort and for the peak-load type lift, there are in the hands of the
regular scheduled carriers insufficient aircraft and flight crews available.
To force the regular scheduled carriers to make them available would
lead to a hopelessly uneconomic situation, the costs of which would
inevitably have to be borne under the policies of the Act of 1938 by
the public treasury. We can already see in the case of many of the
so-called feeder scheduled regulars how an over provision of aircraft
or flights in regular service can enormously increase the cost to the
public treasury.
The point is that while the regular scheduled carriers cannot and
should not provide sufficient planes or flight crews to meet peak loads
or to engage in certain types of marginal pioneering traffic, the large
irregulars are, on the other hand, in a position to meet the peak loads
and to do the pioneering. In addition to this, they are in a position to
provide a considerable part of the reserve airlift for use in cases of
national emergency. Thus, from the economic point of view, the large
irregulars are supplementary to and also complementary to the regular
scheduled airline operations. As to the pioneering and developmental
type of traffic, it is doubtful to what extent the regular scheduled lines
receiving airmail pay subsidy should be encouraged to engage in this
type of work. After all, if operations turn out to be unprofitable the
burden is borne by the government. If, on the other hand, they prove
in the end to be profitable the rewards are reaped entirely by the carrier.
In the case of the peak load periods and types of movement, it is inevitable that in the absence of the large irregulars continuing pressure will
be brought on the regular scheduled lines to provide more planes than
can be absorbed economically in scheduled operation. The alternative,
after all, is to leave the traffic on the ground and, in an industry which
is inevitably affected by political pressures, the consequences can clearly
be foreseen by anyone acquainted with the American political system.
If the large irregulars may be permitted to work in harmony with the
regular scheduled carriers, it will be possible to keep the aircraft (the
numbers of aircraft) in the hands of the latter at adequate levels
comensurate with the economic capacity of the industry to sustain them.
The entrepreneurial risk, in fact, the full cost of providing the standby
facilities will be borne by the large irregulars. This is satisfactory to
them provided that current regulations can be so modified as to permit
them to fulfill their true economic role as supplementary to and complementary to the regular lines.
One possibility in terms of changing existing regulations which the
large irregulars have brought to the attention of the Civil Aeronautics
Board is this: While the large irregulars accept the idea of a limited
number of flights per year between any two points, they believe
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that the economic interests of the industry would be better served
by .permitting these flights to take place at any time within a given
annual period. Thus for example, on New York to Miami the large
irregulars would be permitted to concentrate their flights between these
two points at seasons when peak-load traffic is available and could hardly
be lifted satisfactorily or economically by the regular scheduled carriers,
At another season the same planes which had Successfully assisted in
lifting this traffic peak might be deployed in an entirely different type
of movement, such as for example, carrying migrant workers from the
Carribean or off-shore islands into the United States, or carrying on a
charter basis students and teachers to Europe for summer vacations.
At still another time, under unexpected circumstances, the bulk of the
large irregulars might be engaged in a military type operation in supplement to the planes of the military and at no detriment to the operations
or the availability of the regular scheduled carriers' flights in domestic
or international service.
In the past it has been popular to regard the large irregulars as
essentially competitive in their operations with the regular scheduled
lines. This argument has usually carried as a corollary the fact that the
regular scheduled lines are supported at public expense and that to
permit competition by non-scheduled carriers is, in effect, to permit
unconscionable competition with a publicly-supported transport
medium. The fallaciousness of this line of argument can be seen when
the total picture of commercial aviation and the interlocking relationship between the various different sectors of the industry is examined.
While it is theoretically possible in many cases, and has practically occurred in some cases, that large irregulars have directly competed and
are even uneconomically competing with regular scheduled operations,
there is nothing inherent in the situation to make this a necessary condition for the future. What is needed is a line of public policy which
will avoid deciding either entirely for the regular scheduled lines or,
on the other hand, permitting unbridled operations on the part of the
large irregulars. In economic terms what is necessary here in the public
interest is to so shape public policy that the large irregulars, in their
operations, will support and complement regular scheduled carriers
and will have a sufficient scope within regulatory policy to fulfill to the
greatest possible extent their true role of economic usefulness in an
expanding industry.
V-

ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN ENTRY
INTO COMMERCIAL

AVIATION

Lastly, some consideration should be devoted to those economic
principles which should govern the administration of regulatory power
over entry into a relatively new and rapidly growing branch of public
transportation. It may be suggested as a general principle that, while
some limitation on freedom of entry is probably inevitable in most
forms of public transportation. the degree of control over entry should
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be relatively less stringent in the earlier phases of the development of
any particular form. In the long run it may be that civil aviation will
mature to the point where we will require the kinds of rigid controls
which have been in effect in the field of railroad transportation, since
the amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1920. It should be
noted, however, as a matter of historical interest, that during the growth
period in railroading, while there were certain technical limitations
in the form of the necessities for getting railroad charters and obtaining
powers of eminent domain, the major emphasis of public policy was on
more railroads rather than fewer. While some competitive wastes may
have resulted from these policies there is no question but what the
industry in this country grew to maturity with tremendous rapidity
and played a tremendous role in the economic and industrial growth
of the United States. A more recent, and perhaps a more illuminating
historical analogy may be drawn from the field of motor transportation,
particularly in the field of motor trucks. Here in an industry which,
in some respects is hardly much older than civil aviation, has passed
through a period of rapid growth followed by the imposition of control
over entry, first by the States and later by the Federal Government in
1935 in the Motor Carriers Act of that year. The Motor Carriers Act
was enacted in the midst of a great national depression and seems to
have been propelled through the Congress by a combination of forces
not all of them disinterested. While many established trucking lines
were anxious to freeze the route pattern as of that time, and succeeded
in doing so under the so-called Grandfather-RightsProvision of the
1935 Act, there was additional pressure from the railroads who were,
in the last analysis, interested insofar as possible in limiting the further
growth of Motor Carrier operations. In the light of subsequent developments it is not entirely clear that from the point of view of the national
interest the imposition of control of the rigid sort encountered in the
subsequent decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission was
entirely in the public interest. But be that as it may, it by no means
follows that because we have established fairly rigid control in the case
of railroads, now relatively speaking a declining branch of civil transportation, that we should necessarily do the same in connection with
civil aviation. Civil aviation presents a number of differences from
other forms of transportation. It may be argued, and perhaps argued
correctly, that the number of airlines which are guaranteed a living,
the number of air common carriers who are given full public support under the terms of the Act of 1938, must necessarily be restricted. This, however, has nothing to do with the case of the large
irregulars. The real analogy here would seem to come in the field of
surface transportation by water beyond the confines of the United
States. Here we have a limited number of lines of American flag carriers
in international service which are, in fact, subsidized by the Federal
Government. But we also have virtually complete freedom of entry
for other lines, both American flag and foreign flag, in international
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commerce. This is all the more remarkable because in general the
American merchant marine in international service has long been one
of the weaker branches of the American economy. Yet still it should
be noted we permit a degree of freedom of entry here which may, in
part at least, be based upon the inherent economics and the economic
principles which should control a regulatory body in deciding for or
against a given amount of freedom of entry.
Even if in the long run it will be necessary in the public interest
to impose a fairly strict type of control over freedom of entry into commercial aviation, it is suggested that this is not the time, at the present
stage of aviation development, to impose rigid limitations. This does
not mean that the large irregulars wish to have no control exercised
over freedom of entry. On the contrary, we suggest that what is called
for is a degree of control and an administration of control which will
recognize the inherently essential and complementary role which the
large irregulars are prepared to perform, which they have been performing, and which they give promise of continuing to perform in the future
in the development of both domestic and international air service
under the American flag.

